NAME
épreuve · threat-informed audit readiness for SOC 2. Every control claims it works. Put it à l'épreuve.
SYNOPSIS
épreuve recon <register> [--vendors] [--peer-breaches] [--incidents] épreuve hunt <target> [--positions] [--payload <your-record>] épreuve challenge <result> --reviewer <name> épreuve debrief [--view team|risk|board|engineering|auditor] épreuve --pilot épreuve --for team|auditor finger ayoub sessions -l
DESCRIPTION
Épreuve performs a completed, bounded assessment of your SOC 2 controls with the scrutiny of a red-team engagement. You keep your platform, your risk register, your control operation and your auditor. We take responsibility for the examination and its conclusions, and you pay for completed examination whatever it finds. The work runs in four windows.
01 recon
Steps 00 to 02. Start from your risk register as it is, even when it is generic or stale. Enrich it with breaches at comparable companies, breaches involving your vendors, the types of data you hold and, where you authorise it, your own incident records. Work each top risk into a handful of concrete scenarios, attack and failure paths alike, and write down the protection each path requires. Map that protection to the controls that claim to provide it, listed in your framework or not, judging each by its capability, coverage and reliability against the path. Output: claims to hunt, ordered by the risk they answer to.
02 hunt
Steps 03 to 05. Reconcile the population every position depends on across authoritative sources, and print expected against obtained. Mark the assumptions inside each claim as positions, §like this§, and attack them one at a time with a payload taken from your own records, under scoped, time-bounded, authorised access. Every procedure addresses population completeness, period coverage, the intended protection, and exceptions and bypass paths. Documents, interviews and observation stay in the method where an API cannot answer the question. Each position prints a status and a confidence.
03 challenge
Step 06. An adversarial agent raises structured objections and a named reviewer decides; a hold blocks release until evidence or accountable review resolves it. Together they attack our answer before you see it: favourable conclusions, false alarms, and whether the procedure was adequate at all. Missing evidence stays open; it is never counted as a pass. Review can hold a result. It never turns broke into held. “Procedure completed, but no conclusion was issued” is a legitimate line in a debrief.
04 debrief
Steps 07 and 08. One assessment, several views. Your team gets broke, held and open per control with confidence printed and a remediation order. Risk owners get the positions, which are the assumptions in your register, with what held and what did not. The board gets material findings, uncertainty and progress on one page. Engineering gets the trace: exact payload, record and assertion, so they can reperform it. Your auditor gets the handover. The first page of every debrief says what was not run.
THE LOOP
Every scenario runs the same nine steps, and a retest is the loop re-entered where the fact changed. Code executes, an adversarial agent and a named reviewer attack the answer, a person releases.
INVARIANTS
- A result is a function of its inputs: same procedure version, population and period, same bytes. Any change is a new revision.
- AI proposes, code executes, people approve. Model agreement is not approval.
- Missing evidence is never a pass. Our unfinished work is never your evidence limitation.
- A hold blocks release. Review never turns broke into held.
- The original result survives the retest. Scope never shrinks silently.
- Our release is blocked by an unsupported favourable conclusion, an unsupported adverse conclusion, a missed known material failure, missing evidence treated as a pass, whatever your controls did.
- Held, with its confidence and limits, is as useful as broke. There is no finding quota.
POSITIONS
The sample target on this site, T-D1 on the fictional Alder Works, carries one claim with four positions:
Ordinary users §can only§ reach customer files §through central SSO§ §with MFA§, and emergency access is §separately approved§.
Position 2 broke, certain: the application still accepted local username and password. Positions 1 and 3 held, firm. Position 4 stayed open, tentative, because the approvals were never delivered. The reviewer held the result until they arrive. Severity and confidence are printed separately on every line, in the style of a scanner: certain, firm or tentative.
EXIT STATUS
FILES
ENVIRONMENT
LIMITS
Not a penetration test. Not an attestation. No continuous monitoring, hosted trust centre or remediation done for you. No favourable result promised. The sample hunt on this site runs a fixed procedure against a fictional company with no live model; it shows the grammar, not a customer finding.
SEE ALSO
épreuve --pilot · épreuve --for team · épreuve --for auditor · finger ayoub · sessions -l · the console